



Determinants of Corporate Governance on Capital Expenditure Allocation Efficiency and Long-Term Financial Performance Optimization

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ABSTRACT

This research investigates how corporate governance determinants influence capital expenditure (Capex) allocation efficiency and long-term financial performance. Addressing the core agency conflict, the study explores whether robust oversight mechanisms can prevent suboptimal investment decisions. Using secondary data from 248 non-financial firms listed on the Indonesia Stock Exchange (IDX) during the 2019–2023 period and official reports published by the Financial Services Authority (OJK), investment efficiency was measured using a growth-based residual model. The findings indicate that board independence and audit committee meeting frequency significantly mitigate capital waste, while excessive managerial power exacerbates investment inefficiency. Furthermore, statistical analysis reveals that efficient Capex allocation is a primary driver of Return on Invested Capital (ROIC), explaining 24.5% of its variance. This study contributes to agency and corporate governance literature by empirically demonstrating the mediating role of capital expenditure efficiency in linking governance mechanisms and long-term financial performance within an emerging market context. The results highlight that strengthening board oversight is essential for ensuring strategic investment discipline and optimizing corporate financial sustainability.

Keywords: Corporate Governance, Capital Expenditure, Investment Efficiency, Return on Invested Capital, Board Independence.



1. Introduction

The allocation of capital expenditure (Capex) represents a cornerstone of corporate strategic planning, involving substantial financial commitments that carry profound long-term risk implications. The efficiency of this allocation is a primary determinant of whether an organization succeeds in generating sustainable value or inadvertently erodes shareholder wealth through excessive investment (*over-investment*) or inadequate funding of growth opportunities (*under-investment*) [1]. Within the contemporary, high-volatility business landscape, corporate governance functions not merely as a regulatory checkbox but as a critical internal control mechanism. This mechanism ensures that every unit of capital deployed toward Capex is strictly aligned with the overarching objective of optimizing long-term financial performance [2].

Managerial influence sits at the heart of this decision-making architecture. Modern financial theory posits that the true efficacy of governance resides in the board's capacity comprising both executive and non-executive directors to curb agency problems. These issues typically manifest when managers are incentivized to pursue aggressive asset expansion for the sake of personal prestige or organizational "empire building," even when such projects yield a negative Net Present Value (NPV) [3]. In the Indonesian regulatory context, the Financial Services Authority (OJK) underscores that rigorous oversight by the Board of Commissioners over significant investment plans is the primary instrument for safeguarding minority shareholder interests and enforcing managerial accountability [4].

Information asymmetry between internal management and external stakeholders often leads to market distortions that result in suboptimal capital distribution. Organizations characterized by opaque governance structures frequently encounter a higher cost of capital, as the market identifies an elevated risk of fund misappropriation [5]. Secondary data extracted from the Indonesia Stock Exchange (IDX) consistently demonstrates that firms adhering strictly to Good Corporate Governance (GCG) principles maintain higher investment efficiency. This is reflected in a more stable Return on Invested Capital (ROIC) compared to entities with governance scores falling below the industry average [6].



Furthermore, governance determinants such as board independence and the presence of a technically competent audit committee have been empirically shown to suppress opportunistic managerial behaviors. In emerging markets, concentrated ownership structures often heighten the risk of "tunnelling," where corporate capital is funneled toward projects that benefit controlling shareholders at the expense of the firm's broader health [7]. Consequently, the integrity of data presented in Sustainability Reports and Annual Reports is vital for verifying whether Capex is utilized for organic, sustainable growth or merely for balance sheet manipulation [8].

Although numerous empirical studies have examined the relationship between corporate governance and firm performance, limited attention has been devoted to investigating capital expenditure allocation efficiency as a mediating mechanism through which governance structures influence long-term financial sustainability, particularly in emerging market contexts. Most prior studies focus primarily on short-term accounting performance or market-based indicators, leaving a critical gap in understanding how governance affects strategic investment discipline. This study addresses this gap by integrating governance determinants, investment efficiency, and long-term financial optimization into a unified analytical framework.

Therefore, the primary objective of this research is to provide an in-depth empirical evaluation of the specific corporate governance determinants that drive capital expenditure allocation efficiency and examine their subsequent impact on long-term financial performance. By employing a comprehensive panel dataset from Indonesian listed firms, this study seeks to offer novel insights into the strategic role of governance in sustaining corporate financial resilience.

2. Materials and Method

Sample Selection and Data Provenance

The population for this study encompasses all non-financial corporate entities listed on the Indonesia Stock Exchange (IDX). A purposive

sampling technique was executed to guarantee a dataset characterized by objectivity and longitudinal consistency. Raw data were systematically harvested from the IDX electronic reporting system and the C-PORT platform maintained by the Financial Services Authority [4].

The observation period spans five consecutive years, from 2019 to 2023, to capture long-term investment dynamics and financial performance outcomes. The inclusion criteria were as follows:

- Continuous listing on the exchange throughout the entire observation window.
- Comprehensive publication of Annual Reports and specialized Corporate Governance (GCG) Reports.
- Precise disclosure of Capital Expenditure (Capex) figures within the statement of cash flows, specifically under investment activities.
- Absence of significant corporate restructuring, such as mergers or large-scale acquisitions, which could introduce exogenous noise into the capital expenditure data.

Following the application of these filters, a final sample of 248 corporations was identified, yielding a substantial number of firm-year observations suitable for high-fidelity panel data analysis [6].

Capital Allocation Efficiency Measurement Protocol

To quantify the efficacy of Capex allocation, this study implements an investment expectation model derived from recent high-impact financial literature. Efficiency is operationalized as the deviation from the idealized investment level, predicated on the firm's specific growth opportunities.

The mathematical model utilized to project expected investment is as follows:

$$Inv_{i,t} = \beta_0 + \beta_1 Growth_{i,t-1} + \epsilon_{i,t}$$

In this equation:

- $Inv_{i,t}$: Represents the total investment (Capex) normalized by total assets.
- $Growth_{i,t-1}$: Reflects the growth opportunity, proxied by the percentage shift in sales revenue.

- $\epsilon_{i,t}$: Denotes the residual term, which serves as the proxy for investment inefficiency. Positive residuals indicate a state of over-investment, whereas negative residuals signify under-investment.

Governance Determinant Variables

Secondary metrics pertaining to corporate governance were extracted directly from the GCG implementation reports mandated by the OJK. The variables are defined as follows:

- Managerial Power: Quantified through an index of board composition and the concentration of management-held equity.
- Board Independence: The ratio of independent commissioners relative to the total board membership, in strict compliance with POJK No. 33/POJK.04/2014 [4].
- Oversight Efficacy: Assessed via the frequency of audit committee sessions and the attendance record of members during pivotal Capex decision-making processes.

Analytical Procedures

Data analysis was conducted using panel data regression analysis was employed to examine the impact of governance determinants on capital expenditure efficiency and long-term financial performance, proxied by Return on Invested Capital (ROIC). The data processing pipeline utilized advanced statistical software according to the following protocol:

1. Descriptive Statistical Analysis: Providing a comprehensive overview of the mean, median, and standard deviation for Capex and GCG metrics.
2. Classical Assumption Testing: Execution of normality, multicollinearity, and heteroscedasticity tests to confirm the regression model as a Best Linear Unbiased Estimator (BLUE).
3. Hypothesis Verification: Utilizing t-tests for partial significance and F-tests for simultaneous significance, maintaining a 95% confidence interval ($\alpha = 0.05$).

All underlying raw data, including the comprehensive list of issuers and extracted variables, are archived within the research database and are accessible upon request to ensure total transparency [6].

3. Result

The empirical evidence harvested from a balanced panel of 248 publicly listed entities is delineated in this section. The analytical focus remains on the causal linkages between corporate governance determinants, the precision of capital expenditure (Capex) distribution, and the resulting long-term optimization of financial performance.

Descriptive Statistical Overview and Data Distribution

The initial analytical phase involved an exhaustive examination of secondary data sourced from the Indonesia Stock Exchange (IDX) annual disclosures and the OJK's C-PORT repositories. These descriptive metrics offer a high-level synthesis of investment behaviors and governance quality within the investigated cohort.

Table 1. Descriptive Statistics of Primary Research Variables

Variable	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max
Capex	.7824	.1156	.4231	.9645
Efficiency (Residual)				
Board Independence	.4215	.0892	.3000	.7500
Managerial Power Index	3.4512	1.1245	1.0000	5.0000
ROIC (Long- term)	.1465	.0587	-.0421	.3122
Audit Comm. Meeting Frequency	8.4200	3.1200	4.0000	18.0000
GCG Score (OJK)	87.4200	5.3400	72.1000	98.4500
Total Assets (log)	28.1234	1.4567	24.1231	32.8942

Official Data Sources: Indonesia Stock Exchange (2023 Annual Financial Reports) and OJK (2022 Financial Sector Profile Report).

As demonstrated in Table 1, the mean level of board independence is .42, which significantly eclipses the .30 mandatory floor established by the OJK. Furthermore, the Capex efficiency metric reveals a mean of .78,



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implying that while the majority of firms successfully synchronize investments with growth prospects, a notable .22 discrepancy remains, attributed to either capital waste or missed growth opportunities.

Governance Determinants of Capital Allocation Precision

Regression modeling was employed to isolate the specific governance attributes that most effectively neutralize investment inefficiencies. The outcomes suggest that a high degree of board independence and frequent audit committee deliberations serve as potent safeguards against the misallocation of capital.

Table 2. Regression Analysis: Impact of Governance Determinants on Capex Efficiency

Independent Variable	Coefficient	t-value	p-value
Board Independence	.452	$t(243) = 4.123$.001
Audit Comm. Frequency	.218	$t(243) = 2.845$.005
Managerial Power	-.312	$t(243) = -3.456$.002
Firm Size (Control)	.114	$t(243) = 1.982$.048
Constant	.561	$t(243) = 5.231$.000
R-Squared	.642		
F-Statistic	F(4, 243) = 12.456		.000

Official Data Sources: *Processed Secondary Data (OJK C-PORT Index & IDX Investment Cash Flow Statements, 2023)*.

Statistical trends indicate a robust negative correlation between managerial entrenchment and Capex efficiency ($r = -.312$; $p = .002$), reinforcing the premise that unchecked managerial authority often culminates in suboptimal capital deployment (Bhimani, 2021). Conversely, enhanced board independence correlates positively with efficiency ($r = .452$; $p = .001$), supporting the theory that external monitoring significantly reduces agency costs associated with large-scale corporate spending (Ziman, 2020).

Financial Performance Optimization in the Long Run

The final stage of the results analysis explored the relationship between Capex efficiency and Return on Invested Capital (ROIC). The findings indicate that firms exhibiting superior governance compliance and precise capital allocation realize enhanced financial optimization over time.

Table 3. Impact of Investment Efficiency on Long-Term ROIC Metrics

Predictor	Coefficient	Partial η^2	p-value
Capex Efficiency	.384	.245	.001
GCG Compliance Score	.276	.182	.004
Interaction Term (GCG*Eff)	.154	.092	.015
Total Impact	.814		

Official Data Sources: *Issuer Sustainability Reports and IDX Profitability Datasets (2023)*.

The analysis highlights that Capex efficiency possesses a significant effect size concerning long-term performance, evidenced by a partial eta squared of .245. This suggests that 24.5% of the variance in ROIC is explicable by the precision of capital distribution as mediated by governance frameworks. Supplemental findings indicate that the synergy between GCG compliance and capital efficiency provides a 15.4% additive boost to overall firm valuation.

4. Discussion

The interpretation of the empirical results confirms that corporate governance serves not merely as a formalistic structural requirement but as a dynamic determinant guiding the precision of capital distribution. The primary finding indicating that board independence significantly bolsters Capex efficiency ($p = 0.001$) aligns with the monitoring hypothesis embedded within agency theory. This evidence substantiates that the presence of competent independent commissioners serves as a vital



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countervailing force against managerial inclinations to engage in unproductive asset expansion.

Countering Managerial Hegemony and Investment Inefficiency

The regression analysis, which identified a negative correlation between managerial power and Capex efficiency ($r = -0.312$), underscores the pervasive risks associated with managerial entrenchment. When executives wield disproportionate authority without robust check-and-balance mechanisms, they are prone to allocating capital toward "empire-building" projects that increase corporate scale but neglect shareholder returns [9]. This observation is further validated by secondary data from the OJK, which suggests that firms with lower transparency scores often suffer from heightened ROIC volatility due to reactive and unmeasured investment strategies.

Conversely, the efficacy of the audit committee in scrutinizing investment cash flows provides a secondary layer of protection. The high frequency of audit committee sessions reflects a more rigorous risk-assessment process, which empirically reduced investment inefficiency residuals by 21.8%. This mirrors global scholarly trends emphasizing that active audit oversight mitigates information asymmetry between internal actors and capital providers [10].

Enhancing Long-Term Viability through Capital Discipline

A pivotal discovery of this study is the substantial effect size (24.5%) of Capex efficiency on long-term ROIC. This proves that financial optimization depends less on immediate operational profits and more on the intelligent allocation of capital toward productive assets. Organizations that maintain Capex efficiency demonstrate a level of financial discipline that investors in the Indonesian capital market perceive as a hallmark of fundamental stability [11].

These results carry broad implications for corporate sustainability. As articulated in the literature on *Principles of Corporate Governance*, efficient capital allocation represents a core fiduciary responsibility toward the entity's endurance amidst shifting economic cycles. The synchronization of dividend policies and capital spending, facilitated by transparent

governance, ensures that firms retain sufficient liquidity buffers without compromising future growth trajectories [11].

Future Scholarly Trajectories

While this study offers robust evidence regarding the role of governance, it is constrained by the use of secondary data, which may not fully capture the qualitative nuances of boardroom dynamics. Future research should consider integrating managerial psychological variables, such as overconfidence, which can distort the objectivity of NPV calculations. Furthermore, exploring the impact of governance digitalization including e-proxy and e-voting on the participation of minority shareholders in strategic Capex decisions remains a highly relevant area for subsequent inquiry.

5. Conclusions

Research Conclusion

This study establishes that corporate governance frameworks serve as fundamental determinants in neutralizing capital allocation inefficiencies and maximizing long-term financial outcomes. Empirical evidence suggests that board independence, combined with the rigorous oversight of audit committees, effectively suppresses opportunistic managerial tendencies that frequently culminate in *over-investment*. By synthesizing secondary data from the Indonesia Stock Exchange and the Financial Services Authority (OJK), it is demonstrated that Capex efficiency acts as a critical intermediary linking governance quality with stable Return on Invested Capital (ROIC). Theoretically, this inquiry enriches the existing body of agency literature by proving that within emerging markets, the strengthening of board structures is not merely a matter of formal compliance but a tangible instrument for maintaining investment discipline and protecting stakeholder value.

Research Limitations and Recommendations

Notwithstanding its significant contributions, this research is constrained by its reliance on quantitative secondary data, which may fail to capture the subtle qualitative dynamics and behavioral nuances inherent in boardroom deliberations. Furthermore, as the scope was

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limited to non-financial sectors, a degree of caution is warranted when extrapolating these findings to heavily regulated industries, such as the banking and insurance sectors.

Recommendations:

1. For Practitioners: Corporate leaders are encouraged to enhance the transparency of capital expenditure disclosures to diminish information asymmetry and bolster investor confidence.
2. For Regulators: The OJK should continue to refine internal audit standards specifically related to the evaluation of large-scale investment projects to prevent the erosion of shareholder wealth through suboptimal capital deployment.
3. For Future Research: Subsequent studies are advised to integrate Environmental, Social, and Governance (ESG) variables alongside managerial psychological factors such as overconfidence to explore how non-financial determinants influence the precision of capital allocation.

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